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Being, Knowledge, and 
Nature in Novalis
A L I S O N  S T O N E *
i n t r o d u c t i o n
it is now widely recognized that Early German Romanticism makes important 
contributions in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, but there is 
considerable disagreement on what its central philosophical positions are. Ac-
cording to one of its most influential interpreters, Manfred Frank, the German 
Romantics believe that the unity of being underlies finite phenomena, and that 
we can only strive towards, and never achieve, knowledge of being.1 In contrast, 
another leading interpreter, Frederick Beiser, argues that for the Romantics the 
unitary reality underlying finite phenomena can be known because it is a self-real-
izing organic whole which develops in an intelligible way.2 Here I want to provide 
support for a third interpretation of Early German Romanticism through a read-
ing of the writings on nature of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg). I shall argue 
that, from 1795 to 1800, Novalis advances from believing in unknowable being 
to believing that we can know reality, ultimately, to be self-organizing nature, but 
that, because nature organizes itself spontaneously, we cannot understand or 
explain why it assumes the particular forms of organization that it does. Thus, on 
Novalis’s mature view, nature is partly intelligible, insofar as it develops organi-
cally, but partly unintelligible, insofar as it develops spontaneously. The evolution 
in Novalis’s thinking becomes apparent once we appreciate that he has a central 
aim of showing how we could reacquire a (presently lost) experience of natural 
phenomena as “enchanted”—meaningful, mysterious, and animated by spirit.3 As 
* Alison Stone is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lancaster.
1 See, above all, Manfred Frank, Unendliche Annäherung: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik 
[Unendliche Annäherung] (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997).
2 Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781–1801 [German Idealism] 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 349–461; The Romantic Imperative [Romantic Impera-
tive] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
3 As Dennis Mahoney (The Critical Fortunes of a Romantic Novel: Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen 
[Columbia: Camden House, 1994], 125) says, “the chief characteristic of Novalis’s work [is] the at-
tempt to counteract the demystified character of the modern, technical world.”
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it transpires, Novalis can satisfactorily explain how we could overcome our pres-
ently “disenchanted” view of natural things only by arguing that all these things 
correspond meaningfully with one another—correspondences which, he then 
explains, manifest the spontaneous self-organization of nature as a whole.
The change in how Novalis thinks of being and nature is not only of historical 
interest, but also bears on the question of whether, and how, we should revalue 
the natural world. Arguably, modern western conceptions of nature implicitly 
devalue it, and therefore result in environmentally damaging practices.4 Perhaps, 
then, we should revalue natural things by recognizing that they display agency, 
creativity, and rational intelligibility—qualities traditionally seen as sources of value 
in humans. Yet this approach seems to assume that natural things can have value 
only insofar as they resemble or approximate to humans. So perhaps, instead, we 
should revalue natural things by recognizing that they are unintelligibly different 
from us, and merit wonder and respect on that account. However, on its own, the 
principle that we should respect the unintelligibility of nature seems too thin to 
provide everything that is required for renewed ethical appreciation of nature. 
This appreciation must consist in something more complex: a combination of 
the perception that nature is wondrously unintelligible with a perception that, in 
other respects, it exercises creativity and rationality of a recognizable kind. Novalis’s 
mature thought provides a way to combine these perspectives, I hope to show.
The argument of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 offers an initial 
account and evaluation of Frank’s and Beiser’s interpretations of Romanticism. 
This is necessary because a plausible reading of any Romantic thinker must build 
on these interpretations, while also identifying and correcting their limitations. 
Moreover, because these interpretations illuminate the philosophical significance 
of Early German Romanticism (namely, its intervention into post-Kantian debates 
about knowledge and being, self and nature), assessing these interpretations pro-
vides a way in to reading Romanticism—and, specifically, Novalis’s reflections on 
nature—philosophically. With this entry-point established, section 2 re-examines 
Novalis’s account of the unknowability of being in his Fichte-Studies (1795–96). As 
I explain, this account underpins his subsequent idea that romantic poetry can 
“re-enchant” natural phenomena by portraying them as referring, meaningfully, 
to unknowable being (in this context, I explain how Novalis understands “disen-
chantment” and “re-enchantment”).5 Section 3 identifies a problem in Novalis’s 
account of re-enchantment: this account presupposes that we originally experience 
natural phenomena as meaningless, purely material, items (prior to re-imagining 
them poetically), which implies that the “disenchanted” view of nature can never be 
4 See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (London: 
Wildwood House, 1982).
5 Saying that Novalis opposes disenchantment (Entzauberung) might sound anachronistic, but the 
concept, if not the term, is present in his thought, I will argue. The antithetical term ‘Bezauberung’ is 
present. See, for example, Novalis, Schriften, ed. Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960–), II, 
601, #355; Novalis, Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. Margaret Mahony Stoljar (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 1997), 27. Here and subsequently, references to Novalis’s Schriften are to volume, page, and, 
when applicable, fragment number. References are also given to corresponding pages in English 
translations when available. I quote from these translations—but sometimes modify them without 
special notice—whenever possible.
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wholly superseded. Consequently, in section 4 I argue that in his Allgemeine Brouillon 
(General Outline, 1798–99) Novalis adopts the new view that natural things are in 
themselves meaningful and inspirited, and that, in the right culture, we could all 
directly observe and experience these qualities in natural things. Section 5 clarifies 
Novalis’s emergent view that we can know nature as a whole to be spontaneously 
self-organizing, but that, because nature’s development is spontaneous, we can 
never wholly comprehend it. 
This reconstruction of the intellectual trajectory of Novalis cannot suffice to 
justify the more general claim that the Early German Romantics moved away from 
belief in unknowable being toward the belief that infinite, “absolute,” reality can be 
known to be spontaneously creative nature (which, in its spontaneity, nonetheless 
eludes full comprehension).6 But, since Novalis is the most overtly philosophical 
Romantic, and the most closely engaged with epistemological and metaphysical 
questions, my reading of him does significantly increase the plausibility of such an 
interpretation of Romanticism—an interpretation which reconciles Beiser’s and 
Frank’s emphases on the knowability and unknowability of the absolute.
1 .  i n t e r p r e t i n g  e a r l y  g e r m a n  r o m a n t i c i s m
The dispute between Beiser and Frank concerns whether the Romantics believe 
(as Frank claims) that the absolute is the unknowable unity of being, or whether 
they believe (as Beiser claims) that the absolute is the organic and rationally in-
telligible unity of nature. Let us first examine Frank’s interpretation. He argues 
that the Romantics endorse (1) ontological realism, “the thesis that reality exists 
independently of our consciousness,” and (2) epistemological realism, “the thesis 
that we do not possess adequate knowledge of reality.”7 Frank goes on to say that, 
6 Novalis’s transition to the latter belief is not clear-cut; his earlier writings sometimes anticipate his 
later organicism, while the later writings regularly reiterate or re-examine preceding themes. Nonethe-
less, certain tendencies dominate at each phase of Novalis’s thought, and these are my focus here.
7 Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism [Philosophical Founda-
tions], trans. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004), 28. (This is a translation not 
of all of Unendliche Annäherung, but of a manuscript that later became the third part of that book.) 
Frank states that “ontological” and “epistemological” realism together make up Romantic “realism” 
(Philosophical Foundations, 28). He understands Romantic realism in opposition to “idealism,” which he 
takes to be the view that reality depends on our minds, such that we can know it exhaustively (Unendliche 
Annäherung, 27). Some would object to Frank’s definition of ‘epistemological realism’, which, by con-
trast, Kenneth Westphal, for example, defines as the view that “there is a way the world is which does 
not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity; and . . . we can know the way the world is” (Westphal, 
Hegel’s Epistemological Realism [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989], 3; emphasis added). Frank’s definition is also 
a potential source of confusion because Beiser describes his quite different interpretation of Romanti-
cism as “realist” too. For Beiser, though, Romanticism is both realist and idealist: realist in holding 
that reality exists mind-independently, idealist in holding that reality is independently rational (and 
so can be known). Thus, Beiser admits the possibility of “objective” idealism (Beiser, German Idealism, 
11–13)—a position that he ascribes to the Romantics—whereas Frank restricts “idealism” to the thesis 
that reality is mind-dependent. Since the divergences between Frank’s and Beiser’s understandings of 
‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ threaten to obscure rather than illuminate their substantive disagreements, 
I will generally avoid these labels; as Fred Rush notes, “tagging things ‘realist,’ ‘idealist,’ ‘anti-realist,’ 
etc. is [n]ever very helpful” (Rush, review of Foundations, by Manfred Frank, Notre Dame Philosophical 
Reviews, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1024). Moreover, any application of these labels within a 
discussion of Novalis would raise the question of how Novalis understands “idealism” and “realism,” 
but although he refers to these positions and proposes to synthesize them (Novalis, Schriften, III, 384, 
#634; Philosophical Writings, 131), he never explains in what he takes them to consist.
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in endorsing these positions, the Romantics remained faithful to Kant.8 We might 
conclude that Frank thinks that the Romantics believe that we cannot know about 
things as they are in themselves, independently of how they appear to us given 
our mode of representation. However, Frank claims, the Romantics characterize 
the independent reality that they affirm not simply as things in themselves but 
as “the ground of unity of physical and mental reality.”9 The Romantics, Frank 
contends, are monists for whom one unitary substance precedes the distinctions 
between the mental and the physical, and, correspondingly, between subjects and 
objects.10 Why, then, can we not attain knowledge about this unitary substance? 
For the Romantics, all knowing involves conceptual discrimination, and so we 
cannot cognitively apprehend that which is wholly devoid of distinctions. As 
Frank shows, Novalis defends this view of knowledge in his Fichte-Studies. Novalis 
argues that all knowledge and consciousness involve conceptualization and that 
“all conceptualization is determination, involving some form of negation where 
one predicate is contrasted against another.”11 Consciousness distinguishes objects 
from one another and (implicitly) distinguishes the self, as subject of conscious-
ness, from these manifold objects. Consequently, we can only know about or have 
consciousness of finite entities, ones that we conceptualize in their difference 
from other such entities.
As Frank notes, a question arises here. If the Romantics deny that we can know 
about unitary being, then how can they legitimately claim that unitary being exists 
and is, specifically, unitary? Or, as Frank puts it, since the Romantics’ account of 
knowledge means that “we [do not] possess the possibility of securing this [monis-
tic] ontological presupposition through cognitive means,” how is Romantic monism 
defensible?12 Romantic monism would be defensible if it were supported by some 
kind of apprehension of reality as a unity, where this kind of apprehension lacks the 
status of knowledge. Accordingly, Frank argues, the Romantics hold that we sense 
or feel unitary being but do not thereby know about it. The Romantics, including 
Novalis, believe that feeling (Gefühl), whereby things are given to us or sensed by 
us, forms a component in all experience.13 Since everything that we feel has this 
character of being given, givenness constitutes a general character which pervades 
all of these felt things. This single, all-pervasive, character is the unitary being of 
these things.14 On every occasion of feeling, we are aware that something is given 
8 Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 29.
9 Frank, Unendliche Annäherung, 27.
10 Frank, therefore, also characterizes Romanticism as “a combination of ontological monism and 
epistemological realism” (Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 56).
11 Beiser, German Idealism, 372.
12 Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 56.
13 Novalis, Schriften, II, 115, #17; Novalis, Fichte Studies, ed. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 14.
14 According to Frank, the Romantics advance various versions of this argument, all descending 
from arguments made by Jacobi in the second (1789) edition of his Spinoza Letters. Jacobi’s argument 
presupposes his reading of Kant on judgments of being (Kant discusses these when criticizing the 
ontological argument for the existence of God). As Jacobi reads Kant, predicative judgments “posit” 
their predicates relatively, in relation to their subjects, whereas judgments of existence “posit” their 
subjects absolutely, without relation to anything else. We can only legitimately posit something ab-
solutely if it is given to us in sense-experience. Now, for Jacobi, this ‘absolute’/‘relative’ distinction
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and, indirectly, are aware of its givenness or being. Here we do not comprehend 
being through predicative judgments, but simply apprehend being, through our 
feeling, as non-finite and unitary.
Confirming Frank’s interpretation, Novalis in the Fichte-Studies maintains that, 
although we cannot know about being, we do have a feeling of it,15 and this mo-
tivates us to try to grasp being cognitively. But, Novalis writes, we can cognitively 
access being only in the “illusory” form of a plurality of distinct objects.16 Any at-
tempt to cognitively grasp being results merely in the acquisition of another item 
of finite, predicative knowledge. Novalis argues, though, that reflection can make 
us aware that our knowledge of finite entities does not amount to knowledge of 
being. This recognition compels us into fresh attempts to know being—attempts 
which inevitably fail and must endlessly be repeated. Novalis concludes that we must 
acknowledge that our intellectual endeavors, including philosophy, are implicated 
in what he calls this “unending activity” of striving to know being.17
Novalis’s idea of “unending activity” is bound up with what Frank characterizes 
as his anti-foundationalist epistemology. Indeed, Frank avers that the Romantics 
generally endorse anti-foundationalism, namely the view that there are no cer-
tain principles from which the rest of our knowledge can be derived.18 For the 
Romantics, any knowledge-claims which form the starting-point of a philosophy 
can only be tentative and corrigible, liable to refutation or amendment in light 
of subsequent arguments and discoveries. The justification for a belief, therefore, 
increases in proportion as it coheres with all of the other beliefs we have formed. 
Nonetheless, the Romantics deny that we can ascend to certain knowledge through 
a process of systematically correcting our errors. Although we endlessly strive to 
integrate our beliefs, these can never be definitively systematized due to our con-
stant acquisition of new beliefs, which impact upon the entire fabric. For example, 
in Novalis’s version of this anti-foundationalist position, we cannot cease striving 
to know being, but this striving generates endless new finite judgments, each of 
which must be integrated into our existing body of judgments.
Novalis takes being, or unitary substance, to precondition not only the sub-
ject/object distinction, but also the subject’s consciousness of itself, as Frank shows 
implies that the absolute kind of positing is basic, because it is just positing simpliciter, without the 
additional establishing of a relation (Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 61–62). Jacobi infers that the 
basic sense of ‘is’ is existential, and that whatever is, is in the same basic sense, namely, it is given to 
our senses. From this, he reasons that the character of givenness which pervades all sensible things 
is their (unitary) being (Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 69–71; Jacobi, “Concerning the Doctrine 
of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn,” in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel 
Allwill, trans. George di Giovanni [Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994], 194). Jacobi’s 
argument has problems; can he legitimately move from the claim that there is one basic sense of ‘is’ 
to the claim that being is one single phenomenon? Nonetheless, he opens up a line of thinking which 
is decisive for the Romantics.
15 On feeling as the starting-point for intellectual endeavors, see Novalis, Schriften, II, 114–18, 
#15–#19; Fichte Studies, 13–16. On the connection of feeling with being, see Schriften, II, 266–68, #556; 
Fichte Studies, 165–66.
16 Schriften, II, 179–80, #234; Fichte Studies, 77–78.
17 Schriften, II, 270, #566; Fichte Studies, 167.
18 For this definition, see Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 30. Here, Frank calls “foundationalist” 
those “philosophies that start from the certainty of a highest and immediately evident fundamental 
proposition from which our valid beliefs can be derived as logical implications.”
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with reference to the Fichte-Studies. On Frank’s reading, Novalis criticizes Fichte’s 
idea that we each have immediate self-consciousness: an immediate apprehension 
of the unity of the self, preceding reflective self-consciousness. Novalis accepts 
that we have this immediate self-acquaintance, but he denies that it constitutes a 
form of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a mode of consciousness—namely, 
consciousness of the self—and all consciousness is reflective, that is, it attends 
to objects which it represents over against itself;19 in this case, the self as subject 
represents itself as object, so that these two are not immediately identical. Our 
original self-acquaintance must instead consist in self-feeling (Selbstgefühl) because 
in feelings something is given to us, not reflectively grasped.20 That which is given 
to my “self-feeling,” Novalis adds, is being. It might seem that, since this feeling 
is precisely my Selbstgefühl, the unitary “being” that I feel is simply my own unitary 
self.21 Against this, Frank maintains that Novalis uses the notion of “self-feeling” 
to denote not the feeling of a pre-existing self but “the feeling of a dependence 
on being,” “which is not at all graspable under the description I.”22 Although self-
feeling feels a unitary being and not a prior self, self-feeling nevertheless makes 
reflective self-consciousness possible and is, therefore, rightly called “self-feeling.” 
Self-feeling makes self-consciousness possible because the subject-self can recognize 
the object-self to be identical with itself only if it feels that they have something 
in common. But since this common element must precede the subject/object 
division, it must be the undifferentiated unity of being.23
Having sketched the main features of Frank’s interpretation, we can proceed 
to that of Beiser, according to which the Romantics believe that what Frank calls 
“being”—but what Beiser prefers to call “the absolute”—can be known. On Beiser’s 
view, the Romantics conceive the absolute as a unitary, self-sufficient, substance 
which develops organically into the world’s various finite subjects and objects, 
all existing as different stages in the absolute’s self-realization. Because the abso-
lute develops, it follows a plan and thus constitutes an intelligible and rational 
structure which pervades all that exists. So while Beiser agrees with Frank that 
there is a unitary, mind-independent, source of all reality, he differs from Frank 
in holding that this unitary source is rational and knowable (specifically, we can 
know it to be an intelligibly developing organism). However, Beiser makes two 
significant qualifications. First, he admits that he simplifies matters in saying that 
the Romantics take the absolute to exist independently of mind: for them, the 
absolute necessarily develops into mind, or subjectivity, as its fullest realization.24 
19 Schriften, II, 105, #2; Fichte Studies, 5.
20 Schriften, II, 113–14, #15; Fichte Studies, 12–13.
21 So argue Charles Larmore (“Hölderlin and Novalis,” in The Cambridge Companion to German 
Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 154) and Géza von Molnár 
(Novalis’s “Fichte-Studies”: The Foundations of his Aesthetics [Novalis’s “Fichte-Studies”] [The Hague: Mouton, 
1970], 39). However, as Molnár himself shows, the absolute as unity cannot directly be the self; although 
Novalis sometimes calls it the self, this is only because he is considering it from the perspective of the 
self’s endeavor to grasp the unity that lies at its own basis (Molnár, Novalis’s “Fichte-Studies,” 44).
22 Frank, Selbstgefühl (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002), 34, 37.
23 For this argument, see Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 107; and Frank, “Identity and Subjec-
tivity,” in Deconstructive Subjectivities, ed. Peter Dews and Simon Critchley (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
1996), 128 –29.
24 Beiser, German Idealism, 356.
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It is more accurate, then, to say that the absolute exists prior to the subjects that 
manifest or realize it, although, because the absolute necessarily realizes itself as 
these subjects, it cannot exist independently of them. Second, Beiser contends that, 
for the Romantics the absolute—because it is a whole—cannot be known through 
discursive understanding (which is conceptual, predicative, and inferential), but 
only through an intuitive form of reason which is identical to aesthetic perception 
(taking the latter to be perception of wholes).25
To show that Novalis is committed to the idea that the absolute develops or-
ganically and intelligibly, Beiser focuses primarily on Novalis’s most substantial 
philosophical text after the Fichte-Studies, the Allgemeine Brouillon. There Novalis 
insists on seeing nature as visible spirit and spirit as invisible nature:26 that is, both 
nature and spirit are levels of a single, self-organizing reality. Confirming that 
Novalis thinks that reality organizes itself in an intelligible way, the Brouillon also 
suggests that we can rationally intuit the organizing principles behind nature and 
scientific knowledge.27 In notable contrast to Beiser, Frank’s reading of Novalis 
draws principally on the Fichte-Studies, and he dismisses the Brouillon as “genuinely 
fragmentary, in the bad sense” that it remained unfinished.28 Other scholars have 
agreed with Frank that the Brouillon represents a retrograde step for Novalis in 
virtue of its contention that the absolute develops intelligibly and can be known.29 
In fairness, though, we must ask whether Novalis has any good philosophical rea-
sons to move from construing being as unknowable to thinking that being can be 
known to be an organic, self-developing, whole.
I now want to argue that Novalis does have a good reason for this move: his ear-
lier denial that we can know about the absolute conflicts with his concern to “re-en-
chant” nature, a concern which is present from the earliest stages of his thought.30 
This conflict forces Novalis to revise his philosophical views. By re-examining 
Novalis’s writings in relation to the theme of enchantment and disenchantment, 
then, we will be able to confirm that his philosophical position changes between 
the Fichte-Studies and the Allgemeine Brouillon. In particular, he increasingly comes 
to believe that being can be known to be an organic, self-developing, whole (and, 
further, that this whole can be known discursively, not only intuitively). However, 
the emphasis on the unknowability of being which Frank rightly identifies in 
Novalis’s earlier work persists in his later works in a way that Beiser overlooks. For 
the later Novalis, the absolute develops in an irreducibly spontaneous way, and 
25 Beiser, Romantic Imperative, 62.
26 Schriften, III, 252, #69.
27 Schriften, III, 448, #934.
28 Frank, Unendliche Annäherung, 25.
29 William Arctander O’Brien (Novalis: Signs of Revolution [Signs] [Durham: Duke University Press, 
1995], 204) accuses the Brouillon of harboring a “nostalgic desire for transcendent knowledge.” See 
also Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1981), 50–53.
30 For example, Novalis’s early essay, On Inspiration (written between 1788 and 1790), claims that, 
in prehistoric times, “Oriental” people directly experienced nature as the embodiment of a divine 
being and as the inspiration for poetic language (Novalis, Schriften, II, 22–23). Suffusing the essay is 
a favorable contrast between this “enchanted” view of nature and the modern European experience 
of it. For discussion, see Kristin Pfefferkorn, Novalis: A Romantic’s Theory of Language and Poetry (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 61–62.
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therefore we cannot fully understand its development: necessarily, the absolute 
must remain partly incomprehensible to us.
2 .  r o m a n t i c i s m  a n d  t h e  r e - e n c h a n t m e n t  
o f  n a t u r e :  n o v a l i s ’ s  e a r l y  v i e w
In this section, I will begin my reconstruction of Novalis’s philosophical devel-
opment by explaining in what sense he is concerned to “re-enchant” natural 
phenomena. Then, I will trace how this concern informs the epistemological and 
aesthetic views that he presents in his earlier work—that is, in his Fichte-Studies, as 
well as some of his notebooks dating from 1798.
Although, as I remarked above, the disenchantment of nature was always a 
source of concern, Novalis’s most explicit statement of his unhappiness with this 
disenchantment is his late essay, Christendom or Europa (1799). Europa offers a 
schematic history of European civilization which unfavorably contrasts modern, 
enlightened, culture to an idealized version of the Catholic middle ages. Europa 
particularly laments the rise of mechanistic science, secularism, and the Enlighten-
ment commitment to rational explanation. Embedded in this lament is Novalis’s 
unhappiness that our “modern way of thinking” denies that nature is poetic, 
sacred, animate or mysterious.31 This way of thinking, he adds, has “turned the 
infinite, creative music of the universe into the uniform clattering of a monstrous 
mill, driven by the stream of chance.” Europa thus portrays the disenchantment of 
nature as a multi-faceted historical phenomenon, involving our loss of any sense 
that nature is divine, alive, and mysterious.
The elements of Europa’s picture of disenchantment are already contained in 
earlier writings by Novalis, especially his notes on Goethe (late 1798), but also 
his mixed fragment collections from mid-1798. He claims that the ancients were 
animists, who perceived souls (Seelen) and spirits (Geistern) in trees, landscapes, and 
stones.32 But, as civilization has progressed, we have abandoned the ancient belief 
that objects are inherently sacred.33 Indeed, “[t]he age has passed when the spirit of 
God was intelligible [verständlich]. The meaning [Sinn] of the world is lost.”34 Based 
on these comments, we can see that, for Novalis, “disenchantment” has involved 
a three-fold intellectual shift whereby we have ceased to see natural phenomena 
as (1) having intrinsic meaning (Sinn or Bedeutung), (2) embodying spirit(s), and 
(3) being mysterious. Hence, Europa tells us, the characteristically modern view 
is that the earth is meaningless (unbedeutend) and that natural things are neither 
“incomprehensible” nor “deserving of wonder.”35 These three central dimensions 
of disenchantment are interwoven: if one takes natural things to embody spirits, 
then one will find these things meaningful, signifying or indicating the presence 
of spiritual beings. But these spiritual beings, Novalis assumes, are free—that is, 
they can initiate actions independently of any prior conditions.36 Consequently, 
31 Schriften, III, 515; Philosophical Writings, 144.
32 Schriften, II, 648, #476; Philosophical Writings, 117.
33 Schriften, II, 645, #466; Philosophical Writings, 115.
34 Schriften, II, 594, #316; Philosophical Writings, 81
35 Schriften, III, 516, 508; Philosophical Writings, 138, 145.
36 On this definition of freedom, see Novalis, Schriften, II, 288, #647; Fichte Studies, 186.
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the actions of these spirits are not wholly predictable or explicable. The spirits’ 
mystery and unpredictability carries over into the natural things that embody and 
manifest them; thus, when modern scientists treat natural things as exclusively 
material, they are simultaneously denying that these things are “strange.”37
Novalis objects to the disenchanted view of nature, at least in part, because it 
induces humanity to “scorn” natural things instead of responding to them with the 
wonder and respect they deserve.38 Thus, he objects to disenchantment because 
its inevitable consequence is that we devalue nature. Novalis therefore tries to as-
certain how our culture could be transformed so that we could again find natural 
things enchanted—meaningful, inspirited, and mysterious. This project implicitly 
informs his reflections in the Fichte-Studies, with the result that his rethinking of 
knowing as an “unending activity” (with which the text concludes) underpins 
a theory of romantic poetry according to which this kind of poetry re-enchants 
natural phenomena. We must reconsider, firstly, how the Fichte-Studies supports 
Novalis’s theory of romantic poetry, and, secondly, how romantic poetry (on this 
theory) re-enchants natural things.
As we have seen, the Fichte-Studies argues that our awareness of depending on 
being drives us to try to know about being, but that each such attempt results only 
in knowledge of some particular, limited, phenomenon; as Pollen summarizes: 
“[e]verywhere we seek the unconditioned, and find only things.”39 Sections 5 and 
6 of the Fichte-Studies start to draw out how these epistemological claims bear on 
poetry. Novalis stresses that, whenever we attempt to know the absolute, we end 
up only imagining it. He refers to “the element of imagination [Einbildungskraft] 
. . . of the one and only absolute anticipated . . . through the negation of every-
thing absolute.”40 More specifically, if we acknowledge (as we should) that our 
items of knowledge about finite things do not confer knowledge of the absolute, 
then, simultaneously, we begin to experience these finite things differently, as 
indications—or signs (Zeichen)—that the absolute remains unknown, lying be-
yond their finite sphere. When we thus experience perceptible items as signs of 
the absolute, we are imagining the absolute, because we are recasting the finite 
things that are given to us as images (Bilder) or indications of something other 
than themselves—namely, inaccessible being.41 
The Fichte-Studies implies that, if we become rightly self-conscious of the end-
lessness of our quest to know being, then we will acquire a poetic experience of 
the phenomenal world as a realm of images, a “symbolic picture.”42 Poetic activity, 
then, is any activity which brings about such experience of finite entities as images. 
Since philosophy, too, should become conscious of its status as “unending activ-
37 Schriften, II, 646, #468; Philosophical Writings, 116.
38 Schriften, III, 508; Philosophical Writings, 138.
39 Schriften, II, 412, #1; Philosophical Writings, 23.
40 Schriften, II, 273, #568; Fichte Studies, 171.
41 Earlier in the Fichte-Studies, Novalis had defined the imagination (following Kant) as the power 
to connect sensible materials to concepts of the understanding (Schriften, II, 169, #219; Fichte Studies, 
67). Now, modifying this definition, he claims that the imagination presents the sensible as spiritual (as 
pointing to that which lies beyond it but cannot be sensed) while, reciprocally, presenting the spiritual 
as sensible (indicated by its finite image) (Schriften, II, 283, #633; Fichte Studies, 182).
42 Schriften, II, 600, #349; Philosophical Writings, 105.
150 journal of the history of philosophy 46:1  january 2008
ity,” it should become identical with poetic activity in this sense. Any poetic (or 
philosophical-poetic) productions which result from this activity are “romantic,” 
according to Novalis’s famous definition: “[b]y endowing the commonplace with 
a higher meaning, the ordinary with mysterious aspect, the known with the dignity 
of the unknown, the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I romanticize it.”43 
He adds that “[t]he operation for the higher, unknown, mystical, infinite is the 
reverse—this undergoes a logarithmic change through this connection—It takes 
on an ordinary form of expression.” That is, just as we come to experience ordinary 
things as images, simultaneously we imagine being or the absolute, and form an 
(avowedly inadequate) picture of it, through these ordinary things.
Novalis affirms the desirability of a romantic culture, in which poetic experience 
of the world would be widespread due to encouragement from romantic forms 
of philosophy, literature, art, religion, and even politics. He sees this culture as 
desirable partly because it would re-enchant nature, understood (as Novalis often 
does) simply as the totality of finite, material, knowable, objects.44 Each finite item 
within this totality can, in principle, be entirely understood, if one knows (1) its 
distinguishing features, and (2) the conditions that have sufficed for this object to 
be as it is.45 (Generally, Novalis takes ‘understanding’ [Verstand] to be synonymous 
with ‘discursive knowledge’.) The realm of finite phenomena, then, seems neither 
to hold any mystery for us nor to point to any “spirited” dimension beyond itself. 
If, however, we re-experience these finite phenomena poetically, as signs of the 
absolute, then they present themselves as both meaningful and mysterious, since 
they give indications of something which itself defies understanding—which, 
Novalis says, is unverständlich and mysterious (Geheimnißvoll).46 Moreover, on this 
poetic view, natural phenomena acquire an “inspirited” aspect. To see this, we must 
recognize that, for Novalis, my endeavor to know being is equally an endeavor to 
know what unifies me as a self—what makes my subject-self and object-self identi-
cal. Consequently, if I perceive natural phenomena to point to the absolute, then 
I equally perceive them as images of the (unknowable) unity of my own self. As 
Novalis says, one who could lift the veil of Isis—who could epistemically transcend 
the finite sphere—would uncover his or her self.47 From the poetic perspective, 
natural phenomena present themselves as embodying a reference to something 
spiritual—the unifying core of my (non-material, spiritual) self.
It might be objected that Novalis cannot simply associate romantic culture 
with re-enchantment, because, according to the second half of his definition of 
romanticism, the romantic depicts the absolute as mundane and finite. Therefore, 
we might suppose, romantic culture disenchants the absolute, picturing it in terms 
43 Schriften, II, 545, #105; Philosophical Writings, 60.
44 For example, he writes that: “Everything that can become an object is, to that extent, nature” 
(Schriften, II, 166, #205; Fichte Studies, 64). He contrasts nature, which is material, to the person (Schriften, 
II, 158, #157; Fichte Studies, 56).
45 When Novalis says that “[t]he sphere of the object [is] determination” (Schriften, II, 196, #278; 
Fichte Studies, 94)—that objects are fully “determined”—he means that they are both (1) defined by 
the features differentiating them from other objects, and (2) as they are because of a chain of prior 
conditions.
46 Schriften, II, 532, #9; II, 268, #556; Fichte Studies, 166.
47 Schriften, II, 584, #250.
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of finite items that are non-mysterious and materially perceptible. However, this 
operation of “logarithmizing” the absolute presupposes our acknowledgement 
that the finite things in terms of which we picture being are mere images and do 
not adequately represent it. Through this acknowledgement, we retain the insight 
that being itself is infinite and unknowable: “completely spiritual . . . infinite . . . 
mysterious,” as the Fichte-Studies says.48 Romantic culture, then, would uphold an 
enchanted view of being alongside its re-enchantment of natural phenomena.
Novalis believes that we cannot return to the ancient view that divinities popu-
late the world, but that, in a romantic culture, we could at least perceive natural 
things to be signs of the absolute and of the equally inaccessible unity of the self. 
This conception of romantic re-enchantment rests on the philosophical position 
which Frank identifies in Novalis, namely, the position that unitary being underlies 
all existents but that we cannot know about unitary being. Because the absolute 
exists, we can come to experience particular natural things as pointing to it; but, 
because the absolute is unknowable, we can experience these things only as indi-
cating that the absolute lies beyond our ken. However, there is a crucial problem 
with Novalis’s early conception of re-enchantment, I will now argue. 
3 .  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  n o v a l i s ’ s  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  r e - e n c h a n t m e n t
The problem with Novalis’s early conception is that it presupposes that we origi-
nally experience natural things as disenchanted (entirely material, conditioned, 
and fully intelligible), prior to reflecting on our cognitive limitations and coming 
to re-experience nature poetically. Given that we are conscious only of what we 
conceptually discriminate and judge, our original and basic experience is neces-
sarily of a world of separate, mutually conditioning, knowable objects.49 Since the 
totality of these things is nature, our original mode of experience embodies an 
understanding of nature as merely the concatenation of conditioned material 
things. Although we can learn to perceive nature differently, as containing mys-
terious meaning, this is possible only because we first have knowledge of finite 
things, which we can, through self-reflection, come to recognize as insufficient 
for knowledge of the absolute.50 
A number of fragments expose Novalis’s presupposition that we originally find 
natural things disenchanted. In a fragment from early 1798, he writes that
it is only spirit that poeticises objects and changes of material, and . . . the beautiful 
. . . cannot be found already present in phenomena . . . All the sounds which nature 
produces are rough—and devoid of spirit—only the musical soul finds the rustling of 
the forest . . . the babbling of the brook melodious and meaningful [bedeutsam].51
48 Schriften, II, 567–68, #556; Fichte Studies, 166.
49 One might think that surely, insofar as we feel being, we must be conscious of it and not only 
of finite things. But, for Novalis, consciousness is inherently cognitive, while feeling is non-cognitive, 
and hence is not strictly an instance of consciousness. Frank designates feeling “an ideal limiting case 
of consciousness” (Philosophical Foundations, 171).
50 As Hannah explains, “even though the subject’s real-world experience is fixed in necessary ways, 
nothing prevents the subject from reformulating that experience in a poetic fashion” (Richard W. 
Hannah, The Fichtean Dynamic of Novalis’s Poetics [Fichtean Dynamic] [Bern: Peter Lang, 1981], 97).
51 Schriften, II, 543–44, #226; Philosophical Writings, 71.
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Painters, the passage continues, may appear merely to imitate natural phenomena, 
but really they “see actively,” actively learning to find meaning in these initially 
meaningless phenomena. In the notes on Goethe, Novalis likens natural phenom-
ena to relics from classical antiquity on the grounds that both are only “bod[ies] 
which first receive meaning through the eyes of spirit.”52 And in a fragment from 
mid-1798, he maintains that we must actively “posit nature as incomplete, [in 
order] to reach an unknown variable” within it (namely, being).53 We do not 
originally find in natural phenomena any reference to being; we have to posit 
this reference, by striving to know being, and then reflecting that we have gained 
only finite knowledge.
Why should it be problematic that Novalis presupposes that we originally find 
natural phenomena meaningless? This is a problem because he aims to explain 
how our current, disenchanted, view of nature could be overcome. In part, through 
his idea that we can reinterpret natural phenomena as signs of being, he shows 
how we could overcome disenchantment. But partly, too, his position entails that 
even a romantic culture could never completely overcome disenchantment, since 
the disenchanted view of nature will necessarily remain basic to every individual, 
each of whom must learn, individually, to transform his or her own experience. 
Novalis’s conception of romanticism, then, does not fully satisfy his goal of show-
ing how disenchantment could be overcome, since according to his conception 
this overcoming depends upon disenchantment remaining present in the mode 
of experience original to each person.
My claim that Novalis presumes that we have an “original” understanding of 
nature may well be surprising in view of his anti-foundationalism, which states 
that we have no incorrigible principles or items of knowledge. Our originally 
disenchanted understanding of nature can be corrected, though, according to 
Novalis, if we start to re-experience finite things as images of being. Nonetheless, 
he presupposes that this disenchanted understanding is basic to all of us, and this 
sits uneasily with his anti-foundationalism. This tension arises because Novalis’s 
anti-foundationalism is actually bound up, as we saw earlier, with his idea that we 
cannot know being, but can know only finite entities—an idea which implies that 
we necessarily understand nature to be disenchanted (to be the totality of finite, 
knowable, entities), prior to recasting our experience poetically. Novalis’s view 
that our knowledge is confined to the realm of finite objects implies that a certain 
understanding of nature is basic to humanity, even though this implication stands 
in some tension with his anti-foundationalism.54
52 Schriften, II, 640, #445; Philosophical Writings, 111–12.
53 Schriften, II, 559, #151; Philosophical Writings, 65.
54 Another problem is that Novalis’s history of civilization states that disenchantment has only 
become endemic in modernity; how, then, can it be basic to all humanity? Here Novalis argues that 
pre-modern cultures were more poetic and therefore encouraged people to romanticize their experi-
ence; because modernity is prosaic, it fails to do this and leaves people with their original mode of 
experience (Schriften, II, 533, #33; Philosophical Writings, 27). A less tractable problem is that Novalis 
values those—especially children, including his late fiancée, Sophie—who spontaneously find the 
world enchanted, not yet having been corrupted by prosaic modern ways. This clearly suggests that 
disenchantment is not our original mode of experience at all, but must be learned. At this point, 
Novalis’s epistemological views, with their implication that disenchantment is basic, again clash with 
his desire to think that disenchantment can be overcome (an overcoming of which he sees Sophie as 
a harbinger). See also note 82.
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Novalis does not overtly acknowledge the problem with his early conception 
of re-enchantment, but over the course of 1798 he revises his conception of the 
poetry/nature relation in ways that recognizably address this problem. In general, 
to solve this problem, he must adopt a revised epistemology, according to which 
we can (at least given appropriate cultural conditions) originally and directly find 
natural things meaningful and inspirited, without having to first transform an 
initially antithetical mode of experience. Novalis moves toward this solution with 
his much-maligned doctrine of “magical idealism” (magischer Idealismus), which 
features repeatedly in his various fragment collections from early to mid-1798, 
and recurs at intervals in the Allgemeine Brouillon. According to his main formula-
tions of the doctrine of magical idealism, we should learn to develop our control 
over our “external” senses, the senses through which we receive stimuli from the 
outer world. If we could control our outer senses fully, then we could perceive the 
outer world as we choose, unconstrained by external events. Someone with such 
self-control “will compel his senses to produce for him the shape he demands—and 
he will be able to live in his world.”55 Such a person would be a “magical idealist,” 
so-called because “magic is the art of using the senses at will [willkürlich]”56 to 
create impressions which depend for their existence upon only the self and not 
the external world.
Readers have often dismissed Novalis’s magical idealism as fantastic, but we 
can appreciate that the doctrine does, at least, respond to the problem that af-
fected his previous account of re-enchantment.57 One element of the doctrine is 
its injunction that we should free ourselves from being constrained to perceive 
those natural effects that would ordinarily follow when their conditions are given. 
For example, should I see a bird’s egg break open, I should be able to see a dog 
emerge, or perhaps a human being or any other entity that I choose; the “natural 
world” would thus become “a wonder-world,” Novalis writes.58 He also states that, 
in becoming “independent of the actual world of the senses,” we would “become 
accustomed to the world of signs.”59 We would choose to perceive those effects 
which strike us as having incomprehensible significance, and so as pointing to 
the unity of being beyond the sphere of finite things. An important element of 
magical idealism, then, is its prescription that we should raise ourselves to a psy-
cho-physical state in which our primary experience of the world is no longer that 
of a meaningless chain of conditions, but, rather, that of a directly significant and 
mysterious realm. With this doctrine, Novalis apparently succeeds in identifying a 
way in which we could fully overcome disenchantment: by transforming our basic 
mode of representation and the sensory functions with which it is entwined.
Unfortunately, there is a tension in Novalis’s doctrine of magical. Although he 
claims that magical idealism (and the practices it recommends) provides a way to 
55 Schriften, III, 583, #247.
56 Schriften, II, 546, #109.
57 In partial defense of magical idealism, Beiser and Neubauer argue that it also involves cultivating 
the outer senses to perceive meanings that nature antecedently contains. See Beiser, German Idealism, 
425; and John Neubauer, Bifocal Vision: Novalis’s Philosophy of Nature and Disease [Bifocal Vision] (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 63–67. 
58 Schriften, II, 548, #112.
59 Schriften, II, 549–50, #117.
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overcome disenchantment completely, the doctrine actually presupposes a disen-
chanted understanding of nature as the totality of material bodies interacting in 
causally determined ways. In particular, the doctrine of magical idealism assumes 
that the sentient body is part of the world’s nexus of conditions and determina-
tions: “the body . . . is dependent on external stimuli, whose essence we call nature 
or the external world.”60 Our aim is to lift our outer senses clear of this nexus and 
bring them under the control of the mind. Now, Novalis does not merely believe 
that we originally experience our senses as determinate, conditioned items and 
that we must come to re-experience the senses poetically.61 Rather, according to 
magical idealism, we become able to experience anything poetically only through 
our prior activity of gaining control of our outer senses (so that we can perceive 
just those events that we opt to perceive). But to gain control of the outer senses, 
we must control the body through concrete medical and psychological practices. 
Novalis assumes, then, that the self can freely choose to engage in physical practices 
which transform the body and (somehow) bring it, and the outer senses, under the 
self’s control. Here Novalis presumes a contrast whereby subjectivity is uniquely 
free (the self chooses to engage in self-transforming practices, or it chooses what 
sensory impressions it wants to receive), while physical nature is completely deter-
mined. As Novalis says, “freedom is only thinkable in opposition to a world.”62 This 
contrast is a problem not only because it creates a puzzle about how non-physical 
subjectivity can intervene into the physical sphere, but also because it means that 
magical idealism is predicated on the belief that nature is purely material, wholly 
conditioned, and intelligible. Even as magical idealism promises to show how we 
could definitively overcome disenchantment, the doctrine presupposes the truth 
of a disenchanted view of nature. So although magical idealism seemed to have the 
potential to resolve the problems with Novalis’s previous account of re-enchant-
ment, it actually deepens them. As a result, Novalis continues to need a genuinely 
improved account of re-enchantment. The next section will argue that the central 
tendency of his Allgemeine Brouillon is to develop such an account.
4 .  n o v a l i s ’ s  s c i e n t i f i c  s t u d i e s :  
t h e  s e l f - o r g a n i z i n g  n a t u r a l  w o r l d
Recall that Novalis’s early program of “romanticization” presupposes that each 
of us originally finds nature disenchanted, and so this view still partly accepts the 
inescapability of disenchantment. He must overcome this problem by explaining 
how we could possibly start to find nature directly mysterious and meaningful. 
The explanation he reaches is that every natural phenomenon refers, meaning-
fully, to an infinite range of similarly structured phenomena, so that the quality 
60 Schriften, II, 546, #111; Philosophical Writings, 61.
61 Fichtean interpreters of Novalis maintain that he does advocate changing only how we experi-
ence our senses, which only ever appear to receive outer stimuli due to the ego’s ignorance of its prior 
positing of the non-ego. See, for example, Hannah, Fichtean Dynamic, 29. Such Fichtean readings should 
be rejected: as I argued in section 1, Novalis actually criticizes Fichte by re-emphasizing the self’s de-
pendence on being, a dependence which he thinks is reflected in our sensory and felt responsiveness 
to what is given (Schriften, II, 113–14, #15; Fichte Studies, 13).
62 Schriften, II, 288, #647; Fichte Studies, 186.
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of meaningfulness really exists in natural things, prior to our experience of them. 
Science can make us aware of this quality, whereupon we will directly find natural 
things enchanted. These positions materialize in the Allgemeine Brouillon.
The Brouillon comprises a series of notes towards what Novalis calls an “encyclo-
pedistic” of the sciences: a preliminary plan of the relations between the different 
sciences, providing the basis on which a full encyclopedia could be constructed.63 
The Brouillon draws on the extensive scientific studies which Novalis conducted at 
Freiberg from the summer of 1798 to the spring of 1799. These studies convinced 
Novalis that there are series of correspondences between the processes with which 
the various sciences deal. Specifically, he became convinced (1) that every science 
primarily studies relations, processes, and interactions, since individual entities of 
all kinds are as they are only because of their multiple relations to other things;64 
and (2) that correspondences—“relations—similarities—identities”—obtain 
between these diverse processes and entities.65 For instance, he says that youth 
corresponds to fluidity, age to rigidity; that women correspond to oxygen, men to 
flame; and that sensing recapitulates the process of devouring food at a higher, 
more psychical, level.66 Correspondences also obtain between the principles of 
the different sciences, since their objects of study correspond. In virtue of their 
manifold correspondences, natural processes and phenomena are intrinsically 
meaningful, each one pointing to an infinite variety of similarly structured pro-
cesses. Novalis therefore refers to the “mutual representation of the universe” and states 
that “the universe also speaks.”67 Previously, he had thought that the conditioning 
of every natural phenomenon by its relations to all the others makes nature (in 
principle) meaningless. Now, based on his deeper acquaintance with scientific ac-
counts of these relations, he concludes that they inscribe meaningful references 
in the internal structures of each natural thing.
At this point, Novalis finds himself obliged to provide an explanation for the 
prima facie surprising level of interrelation and systematic integration which he 
has discerned among the various processes of nature. He says, for example, that 
“[e]very phenomenon is a limb in an immeasurable chain—which comprehends 
all phenomena as limbs. The theory of nature must become . . . (a continuum) a 
history—an organic growth.”68 That is, he thinks that the interrelations within 
nature would not obtain so systematically (embracing all phenomena as “limbs”) 
unless these interrelations derived from some self-organizing, growing, agency. In 
order to conceptualize this organizing activity, Novalis draws on some implications 
63 On the Brouillon, see also Theodor Haering, Novalis als Philosoph (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1954), 
ch. 13; Neubauer, Novalis (Boston: Twayne, 1980), ch. 3; and Herbert Uerlings, ed., Novalis und die 
Wissenschaften (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1997). In “Novalis und die Wissenschaften: Forschungsstand und 
Perspektiven” (in Novalis und die Wissenschaften, 1–22), Uerlings construes the Brouillon consistently 
with Novalis’s earlier work, as striving for, but never reaching, knowledge of nature as a whole (11–12). 
Against Uerlings, I take the Brouillon’s incompleteness and fragmentation to reflect Novalis’s new 
convictions that we can have knowledge of nature as a whole, but that this is limited in practice and 
in principle, because of nature’s spontaneity.
64 Schriften, III, 254, #79; III, 261, #113.
65 Schriften, III, 280, #233.
66 Schriften, III, 258, #97; III, 262, #117; III, 288–89, #273.
67 Schriften, III, 246, #137; III, 267–68, #143; Philosophical Writings, 125.
68 Schriften, III, 574, #140.
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of his idea of unitary being—implications that he had hitherto left unexplored. 
These implications surface on occasions in the Fichte-Studies when he equates 
unitary being with nature. He has strong philosophical reasons for doing this. 
Ultimately, neither finite selves nor finite objects can differ from being, otherwise 
being would not be entirely unitary. Being must, therefore, create differentiation 
within itself, structuring itself into different finite subjects and different finite 
objects.69 That being gives itself this complex articulation means that it operates 
in the manner of a self-structuring organism. To Novalis, then, it makes sense to 
equate being with a kind of large-scale organism, or with nature considered as a 
whole, self-organizing, system.
Novalis introduces this connotation of nature in the Fichte-Studies in a note that 
lists nature’s four meanings: (1) the essence of a thing; (2) “all things as such”—the 
totality of finite objects; (3) “[e]verything that is not-person”—the totality of specifi-
cally non-human objects; (4) “the state of a thing that comes into being for its own 
sake without subjective causality.”70 That is, by (4), anything is natural that emerges 
or develops spontaneously without being artificially produced by human agents. 
By (4), then, something is natural when it is self-forming and self-producing—in 
sum, organic (so that even inanimate natural things must somehow be derivative 
approximations to the organic). But since nature—in sense (2), the totality of 
finite things—itself exists spontaneously, not as an effect of human production, 
nature is itself natural—self-producing—and so must be viewed as one large-scale 
organism, within which all entities are interrelated as members. As this large-scale 
organism, nature can be equated with self-organizing being—as Novalis does at 
one point in the Fichte-Studies, referring to “the pure concept of nature” which 
“remains after all abstraction of form”71—a nature which, like being, is a unity 
underlying all differentiated forms. This absolutely unitary being/nature—“the 
whole nature” as Novalis calls it,72 (hereafter, “Nature”)—is irreducible to the 
totality of finite material objects—Novalis’s “actual nature” (hereafter, “nature”). 
Rather, unitary Nature precedes, and structures itself into, this totality.
In the Brouillon, Novalis draws out this implication that being is organic Nature, 
investigating how the absolute structures itself into the myriad levels of nature, 
as well as the many subjects who observe and conceptualize the processes occur-
ring at each level.73 “One can rightly call the complete system of nature a com-
plete individual,” namely, the “world-structure—world-organism.”74 The Brouillon 
sketches a complex account of the universe as an organism. On this account, at 
69 As Frank writes, the Romantics could not have “a philosophy of absolute identity, if its absolute 
did not contain within itself that which it is not: relativity, the difference of separate essential tenden-
cies. . . . The structure of the absolute is thus connected with that of the organism” and of “nature as 
a thoroughly organized being” (Frank, Philosophical Foundations, 123, 122).
70 Schriften, II, 187, #247; Fichte Studies, 85.
71 Schriften, II, 158, #156; Fichte Studies, 56.
72 Schriften, III, 419, #776.
73 Perhaps Novalis left this implication undeveloped in the Fichte-Studies because it amounts to a 
claim to know about being (in its self-structuration, self-organization, etc.)—a claim which conflicts 
with his earlier denial that being can be known. (Beiser notes some other points in the Fichte-Studies 
where Novalis breaches his own strictures and ventures some knowledge-claims about the absolute; 
see Beiser, German Idealism, 416–17.)
74 Schriften, III, 334, #460; III, 352, #503.
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every level in nature we detect organized systems of organized processes, and the 
interlocking of these organized systems derives from the activity of the whole in 
organizing itself.
Each individual life-process is determined by the universal life-process, the natural 
system of an individual is determined both by the other individual natural systems 
and by the higher, universal system—ultimately by the natural system of the universe, 
insofar as this equally determines both of the former. (Novalis, Schriften, III, 334, 
#460)
As that which organizes all of nature, this whole system is also the “world-soul” 
(“[t]he world is the macroanthropos . . . there is a world-soul”), for the soul, accord-
ing to Novalis, just is the form of organization of a material body or, in this case, 
of the material world.75 It follows that, since all natural processes and phenomena 
exhibit at least some level of organization, they too have souls, and are microcosms 
of the world-soul.
Do natural processes and things embody not only life and soul but also spirit? 
Novalis vacillates over this, saying sometimes that spirit is the highest level of orga-
nization of a body and is found only in humans. Spirit is unique to humans because 
we are inherently disunified (containing various conflicting psychical elements) 
and we produce unified personalities in ourselves artificially, through conscious 
activity.76 This makes human organization the highest because it knits together 
the greatest amount of diversity. However, Novalis claims that the organization of 
natural processes is never complete either; rather, these processes constantly strive 
to make themselves more completely formed and organized. Consequently, he 
sometimes—and most consistently—says that all natural processes and phenomena 
have “spirit” too: they strain to render themselves more completely organized (a 
striving which must manifest an activity of the world-soul within them, endeavor-
ing to articulate itself more tightly). Each natural phenomenon embodies spirit, 
understood as the striving for organization, and so each is a “You. (Instead of 
non-self—You.)”: each is another self, as is each human being.77 The spirit within 
human individuals is only a higher manifestation of the same kind of spirit which 
is contained in every natural thing—higher presumably because it results from 
humans’ distinctively conscious pursuit of unification.
Novalis maintains that, because the whole organizes itself, it is self-determin-
ing: it gives itself determinate structure, and it does this freely: “Life is freedom 
of nature.”78 He offers no single, definitive explanation of what he means by 
“freedom.” Rather, two different understandings of freedom operate in different 
places in his work. The first dates from the Fichte-Studies, in which—discussing the 
contrast between determinate objects (Gegenstände) and their indeterminate “op-
75 Schriften, III, 316, #407; Philosophical Writings, 128. Neubauer (Bifocal Vision, 44) argues that 
Novalis located the world’s soul not inside the world (as Schelling did) but outside it, as God. However, 
O’Brien (Signs, 158–59, 216–26) convincingly argues that Novalis regards religious propositions as not 
literally true but merely partial, figurative, perspectives on the absolute. Consequently, Novalis conceives 
the absolute in non-religious terms, including, in the Brouillon, as a systematizing, organizing, force.
76 Schriften, III, 250–51, #63; III, 253, #76.
77 Schriften, III, 430, #820; Philosophical Writings, 135.
78 Schriften, III, 271, #172.
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posite” (Gegensatz), namely, being—Novalis states: “The opposite of all determina-
tion is freedom. The absolute opposite is freedom.”79 On this view, freedom consists 
in the absence of determination; hence, the absolute’s self-organizing activity is 
free because it is the source of all determinacy, and therefore no determinations 
pre-exist it to condition it. Unlike any activities of finite, conditioned processes, 
the activity of the absolute is wholly without ground and, in this sense, purely 
spontaneous. On the other hand, Novalis understands the whole’s self-organiz-
ing activity to be free because the whole develops unconstrained by any exterior 
pressures, following its own plan: “nature [is] at once independent and self-modify-
ing.”80 Nature exercises organic force, manifesting itself in various processes and 
drawing them into relations. Here Nature is not following any particular, finite, 
plan but just developing as any organism, qua organic, must: differentiating itself 
into determinate entities occupying definite relations to one another. Novalis’s 
two understandings of Nature’s freedom seem opposed. If Nature must unfold 
in the way characteristic of anything organic as such, then how can it consistently 
be held that the absolute develops wholly spontaneously, that is, that there is no 
explanation at all for why it develops as it does? Yet Novalis thinks that these two 
types of freedom can co-exist: he says in his notes on physics (late 1799) that 
Nature both follows laws—that is, develops according to regular and predictable 
(organic) patterns—and acts from spontaneous “will” (Wille).81 This co-existence 
is possible if Nature exerts spontaneity with respect to the particular sets of things, 
processes, and relations into which it organically arranges itself. Supporting this, 
Novalis adds that Nature both has “no will”—it must develop organically—and 
has “a particular will”—it exerts will or spontaneity in developing into particular 
things and processes and not others.
How does Novalis’s emergent account of self-organizing Nature improve on 
his earlier conception of romantic re-enchantment? He now claims that, through 
their interconnections, finite natural things are meaningful and “inspirited” prior 
to our experience of them. It is, therefore, possible that we can directly experience 
natural things as meaningful and inspirited, as long as science first makes us aware 
of these qualities within nature.82 Moreover, since each natural thing refers to an 
infinite number of related things and processes, we can never exhaustively decipher 
its meaning, and so, if we come to recognize that natural things are meaningful, 
then we will directly find them mysterious as well. Plainly, Novalis now allocates to 
science a central role in restoring a culture of enchantment. But this science, he 
emphasizes, must not be the traditional, mechanistic science which “cleans[ed] 
the earth . . . of poetry.”83 Rather, the science in question must be poetic, precisely 
because it discloses myriad interrelations within nature. Fortunately, science is 
actually becoming increasingly poetic, Novalis contends: he has in mind such then-
79 Schriften, II, 202, #284; Fichte Studies, 99.
80 Schriften, III, 247, #50; Philosophical Writings, 122.
81 Schriften, III, 601, #291; Philosophical Writings, 157.
82 Moreover, since Novalis thinks that meaning and spirit are antecedently present in nature, 
he can now say consistently that some (such as Sophie, see note 54) might be able to perceive these 
qualities without needing scientific education.
83 Schriften, III, 516; Philosophical Writings, 144.
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burgeoning fields as chemistry, geology, and mineralogy, whose complex systems 
for classifying different substances were (he thought) revealing unexpected and 
infinite series of relationships between these substances.84
To explain how we can overcome disenchantment, Novalis has had to affirm 
that qualities of meaning and spirit are intrinsic to nature. But, to explain how 
natural things enter into the complex organization that gives them these qualities, 
he must in turn appeal to the idea that unitary being is all-encompassing Nature, 
arranging itself into the system of natural processes. With this, Novalis has become 
obliged to claim knowledge about the absolute: specifically, knowledge that the 
absolute structures itself organically, following certain characteristically organic, 
intelligible patterns of development. This seems to contradict his earlier conten-
tion that being is unknowable. Moreover, he apparently presents his knowledge 
about the absolute in a series of inferentially related propositions—including 
those that I have excerpted from the Brouillon. So, does Novalis now take discursive 
knowledge about the absolute to be possible? In the final section, I will argue that 
he does indeed think that the general pattern of Nature’s development can be 
known—discursively—but that, because Nature exercises spontaneity in pursuing 
particular courses of development, we can never understand or explain why it 
assumes the particular forms that it does.
5 .  t h e  k n o w a b l e  a n d  t h e  u n k n o w a b l e  i n  n a t u r e
The Brouillon makes a range of seemingly incompatible claims regarding whether 
the absolute can be known. Sometimes, Novalis reiterates that we can gain knowl-
edge only of finite things, which falls short of knowledge of “Nature [which] is per 
se inconceivable.”85 Elsewhere, though, he claims that the absolute must somehow 
be seen as both unknowable and knowable: “[t]he universe is the absolute subject . 
. . In this its immeasurable [unermeßlich] and at the same time measurable organiza-
tion is already contained.”86 How Nature organizes itself can be both measured and 
known, and also defies measurement and cannot be known. One reading of this 
latter passage readily suggests itself when we also consider Novalis’s claim that “we 
can hope to explain it [i.e., the ‘highest substance’] through the complete work-
ing-out of all the single physical limbs.”87 Together, these claims appear to suggest 
that the world’s organization is in principle completely intelligible, and that our 
knowledge of it would be completed were we to gain exhaustive understanding 
of all the processes in which the absolute manifests itself. But (so this suggestion 
runs) since there are too many such manifestations for anyone to exhaustively 
understand them all, in practice the organization of the absolute can be only 
partially, not completely, deciphered.
84 Novalis stresses scientists’ central preoccupation with classification (Schriften, III, 256, #87; III, 
363, #559)—a preoccupation through which, Europa tells us, scientists have become “the first who 
[have] once more recognized and heralded the sacredness of nature” (Schriften, III, 520; Philosophical 
Writings, 148). 
85 Schriften, III, 302, #342.
86 Schriften, III, 381, #633; Philosophical Writings, 130.
87 Schriften, III, 371, #596.
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Actually, though, Novalis thinks that there are not only practical, but also 
stronger, principled limits on how far we can know about Nature and its self-or-
ganization. In principle, we can never know why Nature organizes itself into just 
these processes and phenomena, because there is no explanatory ground of this 
fact. That Nature manifests itself in these particular phenomena is the effect of 
Nature’s sheer spontaneity. Qua spontaneous, Nature is not rationally intelligible, 
for its spontaneous activity is devoid of any ground at all. Novalis muses: “Has na-
ture always followed laws . . . ?”88 Yet he had already concluded that Nature is both 
law- (or rule-) governed and free of law—in that latter respect being unintelligible 
and a source of wonder: 
Connection of the wonder- and natural world. . . . Wonder- and natural world are . . . 
one. (Rule and non-rule.) Non-rule is . . . arbitrary rule (Willkürregel)—chance—won-
der-rule. Rule—direct law—indirect, (crooked) rule = unrule.”89 
From Novalis’s perspective, we can know that Nature develops organically and regu-
larly, and that, as a result, all particular phenomena and processes are interrelated, 
incorporating references to one another and exhibiting internal organization. But 
we cannot know, for example, why just these chemical substances are the ones that 
exist and why they combine in these specific ways—although we can know that 
these substances must, in general, exhibit complex interrelations and be capable 
of combining and interacting. Nature’s organization is partly knowable (at least in 
principle), in respect of its generally organic, interrelational structure, but partly 
unknowable, in respect of the spontaneity which guides Nature into specific forms 
of organization. Novalis, therefore, insists that all items or fields of knowledge are 
simultaneously “non-knowledges,” and that “[w]hoever produces a science, must 
also . . . produce a non-science—whoever knows how to make something compre-
hensible, must also know how to make it incomprehensible—The teacher must 
be able to produce knowledge and ignorance.”90 Our ignorance stems not merely 
from our practical inability to exhaustively decipher Nature’s organization, but also 
from the fact that this organization is shot through with unfathomable spontaneity. 
Moreover, since each particular phenomenon is a microcosm of Nature as a whole, 
each phenomenon must contain some spontaneity such that no amount of study 
can afford us complete knowledge of it. Hence, Novalis maintains, “Nature is a 
whole—in which each part in itself can never be wholly understood.”91
The idea that we cannot know about Nature’s spontaneity, nor understand 
Nature’s organization insofar as it issues from and reflects this spontaneity, may 
seem self-undermining. Does Novalis not claim, precisely, to know that Nature has 
(in part) the character of spontaneity and that this spontaneity consists in activ-
ity that is groundless? However, to say that Nature is spontaneous is to mark only 
that there is an aspect of Nature’s self-organizing activity about which we cannot 
know, because it just is not rationally intelligible. By marking the existence of this 
aspect, we do not thereby achieve positive knowledge about it; rather, we know 
88 Schriften, III, 430, #827.
89 Schriften, III, 409, #730.
90 Schriften, III, 375–76, #612.
91 Schriften, III, 603, #302; Philosophical Writings, 157.
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that our knowledge of Nature and our understanding of its organization reach 
their limits at this point.
Further evidence that Novalis holds that Nature is in principle only partly know-
able comes from his unfinished novella, The Novices at Saïs [Saïs], largely written 
in 1798. In this work, a succession of individuals outline their perspectives upon 
nature or expound others’ perspectives: the views considered include scientific 
and poetic views, mythic and early metaphysical views that nature is composed of 
the elements, and Fichte’s view that nature is the not-self in need of overcoming. 
Some interlocutors even present aspects of Novalis’s own (mature) view of nature: 
for one speaker, nature has its own spirit—or, “what is the same thing,” it is “a 
single whole . . . bound together in a history.”92 Another speaker adds that each 
natural thing is a “unique You.”93 The implication of this miscellany of claims is 
that no single claim or perspective exhausts or adequately captures the reality of 
Nature. As O’Brien observes, “The composition of Saïs out of so many discontinu-
ous narratives stresses the insufficiency of each: there is no single truth, and no 
privileged discourse, about nature.”94 
Following Beiser’s interpretive lead, one might argue that Saïs only asserts the 
inadequacy to Nature of discursive knowledge-claims, while showing that there is 
an aesthetic mode of knowledge which is more adequate to Nature. According to 
this argument, our reading about the multiplicity of human perspectives on nature 
gives us an aesthetic intuition of Nature as the source of this multiplicity, and as 
the whole ramifying into the infinite multiplicity of finite phenomena and perspec-
tives. Indeed, one of Saïs’s closing speeches comes from a youth who articulates 
just this insight into the multiplicity and creativity of Nature—“its infinite variety, 
its inexhaustible joy” and its “fluidity” with which “only poets should deal.”95 Yet 
the very existence of this speech implies that the content of our aesthetic insight 
into creative Nature can be restated propositionally. Thus, even if Saïs suggests that 
we can have aesthetic knowledge of Nature, the text simultaneously suggests that 
this knowledge can be rearticulated propositionally and that Nature is discursively 
knowable. Then again, Saïs’s broader thrust seems to cancel out this latter sug-
gestion, by implying that even those propositions (by the youth) which articulate 
Novalis’s own conception of self-organizing, generative Nature are as inadequate 
to the infinity of Nature as are all the other proposed views. In short, just as the 
epistemological pronouncements made in the Brouillon initially appeared incon-
sistent, so Saïs, too, seems to contradict itself, implying partly that Nature can be 
known only aesthetically, partly that it can also be known discursively, and partly 
that it cannot be known at all.
We can straightforwardly resolve this apparent contradiction within Saïs by 
supposing that Novalis takes Nature to be both unknowable in certain respects and 
knowable (both aesthetically and discursively) in others. Confirming this supposi-
tion, the text ends with a speech by the “teacher,” who states that one can only 
92 Schriften, I, 99; The Novices of Saïs [Novices], trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Valentin, 1949), 
85.
93 Schriften, I, 100; Novices, 89.
94 O’Brien, Signs, 207.
95 Schriften, I, 105; Novices 107, 108.
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“learn nature’s secrets [through a] . . . system based on experiment, analysis, and 
comparison” if one also learns to “speak of nature with worship and faith” and 
to maintain a feeling of “yearning” for Nature.96 To uncover Nature’s secrets is to 
learn, as Novalis has in the Brouillon, that Nature has certain basic characteristics: 
it is unified, self-organizing, organic, developing, and spontaneous. (This learning 
may arise through the rearticulation of originally aesthetic, intuitive, insights.) 
Yet, in knowing—discursively—that Nature’s characteristics include spontaneity, 
one knows also that one cannot know how or why Nature assumes the particular 
organization that it does. Because Nature thus remains partly unknowable, anyone 
who truly knows its basic characteristics must equally retain a “yearning” to know 
Nature more fully, as the teacher states.
Let me review my reading of Novalis’s intellectual trajectory and clarify how it 
bears on the interpretation of Early German Romanticism more broadly. In his 
Fichte-Studies and earlier fragments, Novalis believes that the unitary being underly-
ing the finite objects of our consciousness cannot be known. This belief supports 
his idea that romantic poetry re-enchants natural things by portraying them as 
ciphers of unknowable being—an idea which attracts Novalis because he wants 
to see how we could overcome the disenchanted experience of nature which pre-
vails today. Yet, because his idea of romantic re-enchantment presupposes that we 
originally—pre-poetically—find natural things disenchanted, this idea also implies, 
troublingly, that we can never wholly escape disenchantment. Novalis, therefore, 
adopts the revised view that, in a poetically-scientific culture, we could appreciate 
the meaningful correspondences and spiritual agency within natural things, both 
characteristics being antecedently present in natural things for us to experience 
directly. In turn, he explains that the organization and agency in natural things 
derive from the spontaneous self-organization of being as Nature. 
My interpretation bears out that of Beiser insofar as it shows, firstly, that No-
valis increasingly comes to understand the absolute as a self-organizing whole, 
and, secondly, that this is his strongest understanding of the absolute (strongest 
because it allows the possibility of fully overcoming disenchantment). However, 
against Beiser, I have argued that both the Brouillon and Saïs suggest that reality’s 
basic characteristics and general mode of development can be known discursively 
as well as aesthetically. Moreover, Frank’s emphasis on the unknowability of being 
remains worthwhile, not only because it accurately characterizes Novalis’s earlier 
writings, but also because it highlights that even the mature Novalis takes our discur-
sive knowledge of being/Nature to be necessarily limited by Nature’s spontaneity. 
Re-reading Novalis through the theme of disenchantment has thus enabled us to 
combine the true elements from both Beiser’s and Frank’s interpretations. 
Moreover, through his idea that Nature unites organic intelligibility with unin-
telligible spontaneity, Novalis revalues Nature (and the natural phenomena which 
manifest it) both for being rationally purposeful and for being mysterious and 
incomprehensible. One might protest that Novalis has not elaborated a compre-
hensive account of precisely how Nature’s organic intelligibility and unintelligible 
spontaneity interweave, or of exactly what natural phenomena, as the products of 
96 Schriften, I, 107–09; Novices 117–21.
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this interweaving, are like. That Novalis gave no such account is unsurprising: he 
was not a professional philosopher and his thought remains fragmentary. None-
theless, I hope to have shown that he opens up a worthwhile direction for think-
ing about being and nature—worthwhile, above all, because it resituates his early 
insight into the unknowability of being within a broader, scientifically informed 
picture of the complex organization of the natural world.97
97 For their helpful comments on the previous version of this paper, I thank the anonymous ref-
erees for the Journal. I also thank those who responded to an earlier draft presented at the University 
of Sussex Philosophy Society, and Garrath Williams for some help with translation.
